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Abstract 
This paper 1s dealing with the tendency to resolve employment disputes in 
Employment Tribunals instead of Employment Courts. As a result Employment Courts 
lose parts of its original jurisdiction to these institutions. New Zealand has recently 
followed this trend by establishing the Employment Relations Authority. The author will 
describe the employment dispute resolution system in New Zealand. However, the main 
focus will be on the role, power and jurisdiction of the Employment Relations Authority 
because it is an entirely new institution for New Zealand. The new legislation is 
accompanied by terms that require clarification because they are not defined in the act. 
The Author will try to shape the patterns of this provisions and make suggestions for 
improvements. 
The second part of the paper will show the approach of other countries to resolve 
industrial disputes. Germany, England, Ireland and Canada have developed mechanisms 
that differ from New Zealand's legislation. This is followed by a comparison where 
differences and similarities will be presented. The Author will explain why Germany 
cannot make legislation similar to the one of Common Law countries. 
The author will come to the conclusion that New Zealand has made a promising 
step by creating the Employment Relations Authority. But there are concerns about the 
Jack of safeguards that restrain the power of the Authority. 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents page and Appendix I) comprises 
12.533 words. 
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I. Introduction 
In western industrialised societies it is quite common that a party litigates when the 
party thinks he/she has been treated unfairly or has a claim against the other party. In 
cases where claims result from personal relationships such as family or employment 
relationships the courtroom is often not the best place to settle the dispute. Because of the 
special relationship of the parties a personal atmosphere and a process without legal 
technicalities prorruses to be an easier way in order to settle the claim. Since the 1960' s it 
is well known that opponents themselves best resolve industrial disputes . England, for 
example, has established in 1964 1 an industrial tribunal to deal with payment disputes 
between employees and employers. Since then industrialised countries have established 
sirrular institutions in order to support employees, employers, trade unions and employers' 
associations in their attempt to resolve their disputes. S lOl(a) of the Employment 
Relations Act states that in order to resolve industrial disputes, "access to both 
information and Mediation services is more important than adherence to rigid formal 
procedures" . Following this idea the Employment Relations Act 2000 has established a 
system where individual and collective disputes are resolved in a mutual agreement rather 
than by a third party decision. 
A further reason to settle disputes outside the courtroom is the fact that Courts just 
would not be able to make a judgment in a reasonable period of time. The legal 
proceeding is too formal and therefore too time consurrung. The parties would have to 
wait very long for a decision and would have to face high financial risks . Therefore 
disputes where emotional problems are more important than legal problems are better 
resolved during Mediation. If the parties are not able to settle the dispute through 
Mediation it is necessary that a third party makes a final and binding decision for them. 
For this purpose the Employment Relations Act 2000 establishes the Employment 
Relations Authority to make fair deterrrunations that settle the dispute. 
Industrial dispute resolution in New Zealand begins with Mediation on the lowest 
level but can extend up to the making of binding decisions. The purpose of this paper is to 
show the industrial dispute resolution mechanism of New Zealand. New Zealand has 
experienced in 2000 some major changes through the introduction of the Employment 
Relations Act.2 The author will try to answer some of the open questions, which came up 
with the new legislation. It will be focused on the Employment Relations Authority and its 
1 S. Deakin and G. Morris Labour Law (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1998) 2.4. l 
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ability to investigate. Furthermore, the Author will define what it means for the 
Employment Relations Authority3 to act within the principle of natural justice during the 
investigation process. The Author will explain his concerns about the fact that the 
Authority has powers of a court but does not to respect the rules of a court procedure. 
Finally, suggestions will be made how the system could be improved without jeopardising 
the advantages of a fast and inexpensive procedure. The paper will also show the 
advantages and disadvantages of industrial dispute resolution outside the courtroom. 
In a second step the industrial dispute resolution institution of Germany, Ireland, 
England and Wales and Canada are presented. All of them have experienced changes in 
recent years in order to make them more effective. The Author will compare them with 
New Zealand and show if solutions from other countries could improve New Zealand's 
legislation. It will also be shown why the German legislation varies from the one of 
Common Law countries and why a similar dispute resolution mechanism has not been 
introduced. 
II. New Zealand's new system 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 has altered, among other things, the dispute 
resolution system for employment relation problems4. This was necessary because the 
procedure under the old Employment Tribunal was criticised as being too formal and too 
time consuming. 5 Now it mainly consists of three different institutions building a 
hierarchical structure. The first institution to which parties go is the Mediation Service; 
this is followed by the Employment Relations Authority and should this fail the parties 
can "appeal"6 to the Employment Court7. The underlying policy for all of the institutions 
and procedures is outlined in s 143 ERA. The most important insight, which was the 
reason to establish the Authority, is number (f) where it is recognised "that judicial 
intervention at the lowest level needs to be that of a specialist decision-making body that 
is not inhibited by strict procedural requirements". 
2 hereinafter referred as to the ERA 
3 hereinafter referred as to the Authority 
4 for definition see s 5 ERA 
5 Paul Roth "Review: Employment Law" (2001 ) 4 NZLR 475, 477 
6 please see page 16 
7 hereinafter referred as to the Court 
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1. The Mediation Service 
The first possibility to settle employment relation problems in New Zealand is 
provided by the Mediation Service. Mediation became under the ERA compulsory and has 
to be attended in all employment disputes. In comparison to the Authority the Mediation 
Service is the main Mediation provider.8 The chief executive of the Department of Labour 
must employ under s 144(1) ERA staff that provides Mediation. They also determine how 
the service is provided. In s 143 the ERA recognises that employment relationship 
problems are best solved by the parties themselves or with little help from a Mediator. 
Consequently, the state provides a low-level Mediation Service in order to resolve most 
issues. In an attempt to assist the parties the Mediator can provide the service by way of 
telephone, e-mail , facsimile etc.9 This enables the Mediator to act quickly and enables the 
parties to resolve their problems instantly. In practise, it is more likely that the Mediator 
meets with the parties in personal. Here the Mediator can ask for information from the 
parties including documents or statements. 10 The parties give the information voluntarily 
so there are no sanctions that can be imposed upon a party to provide information. But if a 
party does not give adequate information it is likely that the Authority orders further 
Mediation because the parties have not explored all Mediation possibilities. The Authority 
member has to ask whether the Mediator has acted differently if he/she has had the 
missing information and based on this whether a settlement could have been possible. 
The service ranges from providing information up to assisting parties when they 
want to alter their terms and conditions of employment. 11 The main purpose, however, is 
to provide Mediation in order to limit further judicial intervention. The Mediation service 
is designed to resolve problems at a short notice and in a flexible way, before the parties 
become entrenched in their positions.12 Formal requirements are kept to a minimum to 
facilitate a speedy process. Therefore Mediators work without a specific code of practice. 
The person who is providing the service decides about the appropriate measures to deal 
with the case. 13 Consequently, the possibilities to have failures in the procedure reviewed 
are restricted. The Act prevents the Mediation services from being challenged on the 
ground that either the nature and content of the services were provided or the manner in 
8 Alastair Dumbleton "The Employment Relations Authority gets under way" (2001 ) 26(1) NZJIR 119, 119 
9 s 145(2) ERA 
10 s 147(2) ERA 
11 s 144(2) ERA 
12 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith A Guide to the E111ployme11t Relations Act (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 
10.3 
13 s 147(1) ERA 
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which the service is provided was inappropriate. 14 The provision of immunity supports the 
process by allowing Mediators to offer their service in a fast, flexible and non-legalistic 
manner without having to fear that their methods are declared as inappropriate. It also 
pays tribute to the fact that Mediators are normally not as much legally trained as judges. 
It cannot be expected that Mediators are capable of carrying out an entire legal procedure. 
In addition, to ensure independence, the Mediator cannot be a member of the Authority or 
the Court simultaneously. 15 
The Mediator has no power to make determinations. The parties must reach any 
settlement in a voluntary agreement. In that case the parties can have the agreement signed 
by the Mediator. The terms become binding and enforceable and could not be brought, 
with exceptions, before an institution of a higher hierarchy. 16 The parties can also agree 
that the person providing Mediation makes a binding decision to settle the case. Binding 
agreements and terms of settlements are enforced by way of compliance order obtained 
before the Authority or in case of monetary settlements, by way of compliance order or 
through the District Court. 17 The Authority or the Court does not review the settlement. 
In case the Mediator is signing an agreement he/she extends his/her role and takes 
over the responsibilities of an arbitrator. The nature of Mediation is the attempt to support 
parties in a dispute to resolve their issues. The role of the Mediator is to help both sides to 
understand the situation of the other side and to figure out steps to facilitate a mutual 
agreement. 18 Arbitration on the other side differs from Mediation in the way that the 
Arbitrator proposes terms of settlement to the parties, which of course have to be accepted 
voluntarily. Hence, the Arbitrator will gather information about the case and think about a 
fair outcome. 19 Mediators do not get involved deeply in the case as Arbitrators. The 
Mediator in fact does not need to know the details of the case because he/she is only 
interested in a mutual agreement. 
If the ERA gives power to the Mediator to reach an enforceable settlement it 
allocates powers of an Arbitrator to this institution . It could be argued that a Mediator who 
has the ability to reach enforceable settlements is tempted to suggest terms of settlement 
instead of just leading the parties through the process. But after all the Mediator under the 
ERA just signs the mutual agreement. Until this point the Mediator fulfils its role as 
14 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith 10.8 
15 Richard Rudman New Zealand Employment Law Guide (CCH, Auckland, 2002) 117 
16 s 149(3) ERA 
17 s 151 ERA 
18 Peter Spiller Dispute Resolution in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999) 57 
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Mediator because he/she uses its extended powers only at a point when its role as a 
Mediator is already fulfilled because the parties have already reached a mutual agreement. 
The Act allows parties to use other Mediation (s 154 ERA) or Arbitration (s 155 
ERA) service than the one provided by the Department of Labour. In this case settlements 
are not enforceable. The reason not to allow independent Mediators or Arbitrators to reach 
enforceable settlements is that the parties should use the provided service. The parties 
have only limited possibility to have the decision of a lower institution reviewed by the 
next higher institution when followed the provided system. If the parties use other than the 
dispute resolution service of the state this limitation would not apply. In this case the 
settlement must be reviewed entirely by the Court and the aim to ease the workload for 
Employment Courts could not be reached. 
2. The Employment Relations Authority 
S 156 ERA establishes the Employment Relations Authority that follows the 
Employment Tribunal. The purpose to create this new institution was to relieve the 
Employment Court and to establish a more satisfactory dispute resolution system without 
the disadvantages of the old Tribunal. For example, the Authority is now capable to order 
interim reinstatements or allowed to decide in union matters. 20 These issues have formally 
been decided by the Court. The Employment Relations Authority is the second step in the 
hierarchy because under s 159 ERA the parties must have attended Mediation first before 
going to the Authority. The Authority is also required to consider whether the parties 
should be directed to use Mediation at any time during its investigation. 21 The intention is 
to filter out trivial and minor matters, which do not require further investigation and to 
settle matters at the lowest possible level with the least expenditure of time and money.22 
When further Mediation is not likely to contribute to resolve the matter or is of urgent 
nature the Authority may not decide further Mediation. Where the Authority has ordered 
Mediation the proceedings are suspended until the parties have done so. By failing in the 
first Mediation attempt the parties have shown that their dispute is a difficult one to 
resolve and investigation is necessary. 
19 A.J. Geare The System of Industrial Relations in New Zealand (2 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1988) 
[621,622] 
20 Employment Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) [ER161.3] 
21 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith 10.15 
22 Employment Law Guide (159.2) 
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To achieve the goal making problem resolution faster and easier for the parties the 
Authority is dealing with these issues in a "non-adversarial way"23 and should act as 
informal as possible. Therefore the Authority has to deal with less procedural 
requirements than a normal Employment Court. In general the Authority is only bound by 
the principles of natural justice and the provision to act in a reasonable manner.24 
Members of the Authority are not judges but are experienced in industrial relations 
dispute resolution procedure. In case legal advice is necessary during the investigation 
process the Authority can refer to the Employment Court. 25 Under s 178(2) ERA it can 
remove the case to the Court in total if it thinks that an important question of Jaw could 
arise. The Authority can also remove the case to the court when it is in the public interest 
or the Court was involved in a similar or the same case before. A matter is of public 
interest where vital industries are affected by the dispute. Furthermore, public interest 
exists where the outcome of the case may affect a large amount of employment 
relationships. This could happen where, for example, the Court decides that a common 
feature in employment contracts is seen as unlawful and as a result the contract of a large 
amount of employees have to be changed. 
The parties are also entitled to have their matter removed, or a part of it , to the 
Court. In this case they have to comply with the same legal requirements as the 
Authority. 26 
The Court on the other had can under s 178(5) ERA remove the case back to the 
Authority if it thinks that the Authority has not investigated properly. 
(1) Members of the Authority 
The Employment Relations Authority consists of at least three members of which 
one is the Chief of the Authority. 27 The members are appointed by the Governor-General 
and are independent from the Department of Labour. The major task of the Authority is 
dispute resolution on the basis of law and not to resolve questions of Jaw therefore 
members are not judges, barristers or solicitors. In order to achieve this goal Mediations 
skills are more important than legal skills. The focus on non-legalistic skills is also 
23 Employment Relations Bill Explanatory Note (2000), 8 
24 s 173(1) ERA 
25 s 177 ERA 
26 s 178(1) ERA 
27 s 166(1) ERA 
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reflected in the possibilities to challenge determinations of the Authority. Challenges are 
usually not based on legal failures but on unsatisfying determinations. 
(2) Role of the Authority 
S 157(1) ERA explains the role of the Authority. It states that the "Authority is an 
investigative body that has the role of resolving employment relationship problems by 
establishing the facts and making determinations according to the substantial merits of the 
case, without regard to technicalities". The most remarkable innovation is the 
investigative role of this institution. Unlike the Employment Court where it is the duty of 
the parties to provide evidence28 the Authority itself is the investigating body. This role 
marks a new approach in the tradition of New Zealand decision-making. The aim behind 
this change is to generate a more active "judge" who pushes the process quickly ahead. 
Free to decide the circumstances of the investigation procedure the Authority member can 
accelerate the process at any time to achieve this goal.29 
(a) What does 'investigating' mean? 
Although the inquisitorial approach is the most remarkable innovation in the role 
of the Employment Relations Authority the Act itself does not explain what investigating 
means and which legal abilities go along with it. Some tools of investigating process are 
given in s 160(1) ERA. Generally the Authority can require evidence and information 
from the parties or any other person they think can give useful information . It can call any 
witness to a meeting for examination. The control over the investigating process is 
disttibuted to the respective member. The member leads the parties through the whole 
process and especially distinguishes important from unimportant facts. This does not leave 
much room for tactical manoeuvres of lawyers . Consequently, the process becomes more 
speedy and informal than in usual court proceedings.30 
In practice, the main investigation work is done during the investigation meeting 
where the Authority examines parties and witnesses. The Authority is not bound to treat a 
matter as being a matter of the type described by the parties. It focuses on the resolution of 
28 Schedule 3 cl 4 ERA 
29 Employment Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001 ) [ER 160.3] 
30 Alastair Dumbleton "The Employment Relations Authority gets under way" (2001) 26( l ) NZJIR 119, 121 
10 
the problem and therefore can investigate matters, which the parties have not described as 
maJor issues. 
The investigation has to be "related to" the employment relationship and has to 
have the purpose to resolve the problem. Cl 1 in Schedule 2 ERA connects the term 
investigation to its purpose. The power to investigate cannot be used widely despite the 
freedom the Authority is given by s 160 ERA. The investigator should always keep in 
mind that the findings must contribute to a fair decision. On the other hand the Authority 
does not have to "relate to" the matter described by the parties. So the limitation is limited 
through this provision because the investigator decides freely whether a matter is 
necessary in order to make a fair determination. 
Because no other way of getting information is mentioned in s 160(1) ERA then 
from involved parties or witnesses it must be assumed that the Authority is not entitled to 
get information in any other way. But the possibility to get information through these 
people is broad. Schedule 2 cl 5(1) states that the Authority is free to summon any witness 
they think is necessary and cl 5(2) enables it to call for any necessary documents as well. 
This ability is not restricted through the law of evidence. Neither the ERA nor the 
Evidence Act 1908 refers to Authority hearings in any way. The question is how witnesses 
are protected in the investigation meeting and which evidence could be legally used to 
make a determination. The Authority has the powers of a court but does not have its 
safeguards. The purpose of safeguards in legal procedures is the protection of witnesses in 
cases where the witness could come into a conflict of interests . It also protects confidential 
information where the Authority requires disclosure. The Authority should at least be 
made to use the laws of evidence in analogy, for example s 13 and s 14 of the Evidence 
Act 1908. A witness could get easily in conflict when he/she has to testify against his/her 
employer or if the witness is related to one of the parties (even if this is not prohibited in 
the Evidence Act under s 4 in civil courts). There is no reason why witnesses should be 
treated differently when examined in the Authority or in a Court because the personal 
conflict is the same. 
(b) What are the principles of natural justice? 
The adversarial process in the Common Law system has ensured its fair outcomes 
through the principles of natural justice. The principles are a safeguard against corruption 
or unfairness in the system. They ensure the functionality and trust in the whole system 
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and in this case in Authority's determinations. 31 Broadly speaking natural justice is "the 
natural sense of what is right and wrong"32 . S 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 requires that all tribunals act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. S 
173(1)(a) and s 157(2)(a) ERA fulfil this requirement by fixing this principle in two ways. 
The Authority has to "comply with the principles of natural justice" in its role and its 
procedure. The Employment Relations Authority Regulations 2000 refer to these 
principles and explain how they should be interpreted. Regulation 4 states that the 
principles should support successful employment relationships, help to determine the 
substantial merits of a case and grant practical justice to the parties.33 Successful 
relationships exist in this case where the parties act with each other in good faith. 
Consequently, it is the task of the Authority to impose the parties to act good faith 
behaviour where these do not exist. 
Because the Act does not give further explanation one has to refer to case Jaw in 
order to define the term. In David v Employment Relations Authority34 the Court stated 
that the term of natural justice varies "widely according to the nature and the purpose of 
the particular tribunal and the nature and circumstances of the particular case before it." 
The main purpose of this case was to decide if the Authority had to allow cross-
examination. The case was based on the Authority's practice not allowing cross-
examination. In David v Employment Relations Authority the plaintive argued that he 
should have the right to examine witnesses. The Court reasoned that: " 2 .... having regard 
to the nature of the Authority and the subject-matter ... , cross-examination is a necessary 
ingredient of the principles of natural justice at every hearing or meeting .... " 
The reason for not allowing cross-examination was to support the investigating 
role of the Authority. It is the Authority's duty to establish facts on its own and to 
guarantee a speedy process. Hence, it is difficult to understand why the court on one hand 
says that the definition of natural justice depends on the purpose of the tribunal, but on the 
other hand permits cross-examination that contradicts the role of the Authority because it 
is time consuming and therefore delays the process. Moreover, it takes away some of the 
Authority's jurisdiction because establishing the facts should be the sole responsibility of 
the Authority. As a result the Practice Note had to be changed. 
31 Phillip Green "Viva la difference?" (2000) 7 ELB 137, 139 
32 Bryan A. Gamer A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2 ed, Oxford University Press, London, 1995) 581 
33 Mazengarb' s Employment Law (loose leaf, Butterworth ' s, Wellington) [2312] 
34 David v EmploymeHT Relations Authority, Attorney-General and New Zealand Law Society (29 May 2001) 
Employment Court WC16A/Ol Goddard J 
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This decision fits into an earlier decision where the principles of natural justice 
were in question. In Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attomey-General35 the court 
summarised the principles of natural justice: firstly, each party must have the opportunity 
to present its case fully, secondly the opportunity to present evidence and arguing in 
support of its own case and thirdly, to comment on the arguments or evidence of the other 
party. 
It is very difficult to connect the provision of natural justice with the aim of a fast 
and informal process. At some point parts of natural justice probably must be sacrificed to 
maintain the role of the Authority. The Court has decided in David v Employment 
Relations Authority that the right of cross-examination should not be sacrificed. 
In Re Erebus Royal Commission v Mahon36 the court stated that investigation 
under the principle of natural justice contains two main provisions. Firstly, the person who 
makes any findings must base his/her decision upon evidence that has some probative 
value. Secondly, the investigator must listen to any relevant evidence and argument 
conflicting with the findings. This includes warning a person that a finding is likely to be 
made influencing negatively the party's claim. Such a warning enables the party to argue 
on the finding and prevents it from being defenceless against the new situation. During an 
investigation meeting that kind of warning is hardly possible without risking a delay. In 
order to argue substantively to a finding the party might need to consult with his/her 
representative or doing further research. In this situation the role of the Authority is 
influencing its provision of natural justice. In recognition that this is not a criminal case 
and therefore "less" serious for the parties, it is appropriate not to allow further research or 
consultation in order to keep the hearing going. 
In addition, in order to act within the principle of natural justice during the process 
the Authority has to reveal any information that it receives from the other party in order to 
enable the other side to respond. 37 
A further aspect of natural justice is the absence of bias. 38 The Authority member 
is not supposed to support one side in its determination. The investigator has to disregard 
the behaviour of the parties even if they have caused problems during the investigation 
process. 
35 Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452,464 
36 Re Erebus Royal Commission; Air New Zealand v Mahon [1983] l NZLR 662,671 Judicial Committee 
37 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith A Guide to the Employment Relations Act (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 
10.16 
38 C. Harlan and R. Rawlings Law and Administration (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1997) 502 
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There are obviously some intersections between natural justice and the power to 
investigate. In practise, it is most likely that the Authority could harm the principle of 
natural justice during the investigation process. As shown the principles of natural justice 
determine how the parties should be allowed to present their case, how witnesses should 
be examined and mainly that the finding has to be based on proper reasons. When 
investigating the member has always to consider whether the facts are important in order 
to reach a determination. But the investigator does not have to distinguish between legal 
and other argumentation. Findings are relevant when they are the cause or the solution of 
the dispute. Consequently, the right to investigate ends where the measures of the 
investigator are not appropriate anymore in the sense of natural justice. This means where 
a reasonable person is not able to accept the actions of the investigator. 
As mentioned above there are some concerns about the protection of witnesses in 
the process. But in Re £rebus Royal Commission v Mahon39 the court did express that 
"technical rules of evidence applicable to civil or criminal litigation form no part of the 
rules of natural justice". Public institutions are usually bound by the principles of natural 
justice if they fulfil sovereign. The reasons why practice codes are omitted for these 
institutions are that their main purpose is not dealing with legal matters or making legal 
determinations. While investigating the Authority, for example, establishes the facts and 
makes a fair rather than a legal determination. Consequently, technical rules of evidence 
are not necessary where non-legal findings prevail. Therefore in Re £rebus Royal 
Commission v Mahon the judge stated that the findings must be logically comprehensive. 
By taking this statement into account it is even more necessary that the Authority be 
bound by certain own written rules through statute. 
It is not necessarily true that all errors in the administrative proceeding must be 
breaches of natural justice.40 When reviewing the principles of natural justice it is likely 
that Courts more readily and strictly insist on compliance with the rules of natural justice 
the higher the impact of the decision is for the party. 41 The court has to ask how serious 
the lack of observance of administrative rules has effected the determination and whether 
its compliance would have made a difference in its decision. Should the court come to the 
39 Re £rebus Royal Commission; Air New Zealand v Mahon [1983) 1 NZLR 662, 671 Judicial Committee 
40 G.D.S. Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1995) 13.13 
41 Philip A. Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 
23.2.1 
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solution that a different proceeding could have changed the outcome it must refer the case 
back to the original institution. But where a compliance with natural justice would not 
have changed the outcome there is no need for an additional hearing. 
(3) Informality 
A further aspect supporting a quick decision is the informality of the process. The 
respective member of the Authority who is responsible for the case is relatively free from 
formal constrains. S 174 ERA states what kind of information the Authority has to record 
and which ones not. Relevant facts and legal findings have to be stated and explained. The 
Authority does not have to record the whole investigation meeting including evidence or 
statements. The intention is to "produce determinations with fewer details" and reduced 
legalism to situations where the facts influence the findings. 42 A further advantage of 
fewer records is the possibility to reconstruct the whole case and to understand why a 
determination has been made. A matter of concern is the fact that probably not enough 
records exist if a party wishes to challenge the Authority's determination at the Court. It 
would be difficult to prove that the Authority might not have acted in good faith when 
there are no records. 43 But detailed records are not necessary in cases where the party 
wishes to challenge the determination in a hearing de novo.44 This is a whole new hearing 
where the Court is able to establish its own findings without referring to findings of the 
Authority. 
( 4) How to commence the process? 
Despite its informality a person who wants to apply for a determination by the 
Authority has to fulfil some formal requirements . The Authority has jurisdiction to write a 
Practice Note45 that functions as a procedure code in order to guide parties and their 
representatives through the process.46 If a party wishes the investigation of a matter, 
he/she has to complete a statement of problem form in order to inform the Authority and 
opponent about the problem. It also consists of the facts and the resolution sought by the 
applicant. The Authority will then present a copy to the other party who has to reply to the 
problem. The reply will be forwarded to the applicant. In case the other party does not 
42 Employment Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001 ) [ER174.2] 
43 Phillip Green "Viva la difference?" (2000) 7 ELB 137 , 144 
44 s l 79(3)(b) ERA 
45 Employment Authority Regulations 2000 < http://www.gp.co.nz/wooc/bills/analysis/20001 86-reg.html > (last 
accessed 12/05/02) 
46 Richard Rudman New Zealand Employment Law Guide (CCH, Auckland , 2002) 121 
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reply the Authority can under Regulation 9 of the Regulations commence investigating the 
matter and hold an investigation meeting.47 This provision has proven to be useful in 
practice in order to omit delays. Authority staff will check the statements and if necessary 
further information will be required. During a first meeting the member will prepare the 
investigation meeting to make sure that the hearing will focus on the core problems.48 It is 
normally open to the public but the public could be excluded under certain circumstances. 
The meeting has the form of a "round table" where the Authority member, parties and 
witnesses are seated at a table; a clear difference to the formal courtroom seating. The 
member investigates the matters by collecting all necessary facts. The meeting concludes 
with a final statement by the parties or their representatives. The member then will make 
its own decision and submit the written determination a few weeks later to the parties.49 
The process concludes with a binding determination made by the Authority. Once 
a determination is made the Authority cannot take it back or alter it. It has fulfilled its task 
and further or new facts could not be recognised anymore.50 Even if the parties request in 
a mutual agreement to change the determination it can not be altered because the 
Authority has lost its jurisdiction with respect to the particular case. The Authority has no 
jurisdiction to alter determinations of the Authority or to interpret its own determinations. 
The jurisdiction provided by s 161 ERA is closing and does not allow any other 
interpretation for additional jurisdiction. The Court also has no jurisdiction under s 187 
ERA to interpret or to alter an Authority's decision. It can only make a new judgement. 
The parties can apply for the reopening of the investigation when new facts emerge that 
have not known before. The Authority must also decide that reopening the investigation 
would be reasonable.51 It is reasonable when it is likely that the outcome would differ 
from the previous determination. But with respect to its principles a reopening would not 
be reasonable because of the negligence of the party, for example if a party has not 
prepared its case properly. Furthermore, not revealing all facts during the meeting would 
clearly be seen as breach of good faith. It would be unreasonable to permit reopening to a 
person who as acted in bad faith. 
47 Mazengarb 's Employmem Law (loose leaf, Butterworths, Wellington) [2322) 
48 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith A Guide to the Employment Relations Act (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 
10.16 
49 Rudman. 122 
50 Employment Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) [ERl 74.3) 
51 Schedule 2 cl 4 ERA 
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(5) Jurisdiction of the Authority 
One major task of the Authority is to take over some of the work the employment 
Court has done previously. Under s 161 ERA it now has a broad jurisdiction, which 
covers most of the issues arising during an employment relationship. The jurisdiction to 
make determination about these issues is exclusive. This means that parties are not 
entitled to take any action that arises from or is related to an employment relationship to 
any other dispute resolution institution . Because its jurisdiction is exclusive52 no other 
institution can make decisions about these matters and this means also that the Authority 
has not jurisdiction about things that are not listed in s 161(1). S 161(2) ERA states that 
the Authority is not entitled to make determinations relating to any matter involving 
bargaining and fixing terms and conditions of employment. Under s 163 ERA the 
Authority cannot make any determinations with respect to collective agreements. But its 
new power includes the ability to order interim reinstatement in matters of personal 
grievances. 53 If it comes to individual employment agreements the Authority is entitled to 
change certain aspects of the contract.54 This jurisdiction as well was previously part of 
the Employment Court. 
The shift of power relieves the Court from its workload and strengthens the 
Authority ' s role as major dispute resolution body. Although the Authority has this power 
it should exercise it only as last resort, because it is still the alteration of a mutual agreed 
contract. Individual employment agreements should only be changed where the parties 
have not been able to resolve the issues during Mediation or with assistance of the 
Authority and if no other remedy is appropriate. 55 
As mentioned above the Authority has to respect only a few formal requirements 
while making a determination . Nevertheless , a party is able to challenge a determination 
by applying for a new hearing at the Court.56 This challenge is not an appeal (the Act uses 
the term "election") in its legal sense because the reviewed decision was not made by a 
court. The person who challenges the determination does also not want to have a certain 
question of law to be reviewed. The Court reviews the fair outcome of the determination 
and not only the legal application of law. A further difference to an appeal exists in the 
52 Employment Law Guide [ER16l.l l] 
53 s 127(1) ERA 
54 s 162 ERA 
55 s 164 ERA 
56 s 179(1) ERA 
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fact that the Court not only reviews matters that have already considered by the previous 
instance. The Court does in case of a hearing de novo also consider new facts. 57 
Therefore it is sufficient if the party is just dissatisfied with the Authority's 
determination. The "appellant" only has to specify which part he/she is dissatisfied with 
and whether a hearing de novo should be held. 58 The party challenging a determination 
does not have to state a specific legal error or an error in the proceeding. It is enough if the 
party thinks that a different determination would be adequate with respect to the facts 
found by the Authority member. This makes it very easy for a party to have the case 
reviewed because a legal reasoning is not necessary. Just the feeling not have been treated 
fairly is enough to get an entirely new hearing. 
A hearing de novo is unlikely to happen where a party has not acted in good faith 
during the investigation process. The Authority will submit a report to the Court to assess 
whether the parties have acted in bad faith. However, it remains the decision of the Court 
to grant a hearing de novo even if a party has acted in bad faith .59 
The party can also elect a hearing where the Court only reviews a question of 
law.60 The process takes place regardless of whether a party has previously acted in good 
faith or not. S 180 ERA clarifies that the making of an election does not suspend the effect 
of the Authority's determination unless either the Court or the Authority orders that it 
should. 
It should be noted that the Act provides two different ways of challenging the 
Authority. The previous section describes how a determination according to the respective 
matter could be challenged. To promote flexibility and informality not all actions of the 
Authority members can be reviewed by the Court. S 184 ERA limits the possibility to 
challenge determinations or orders in the Authority' s procedure. The challenge could only 
be based on a lack of jurisdiction. The lack occurs where the Authority was not entitled to 
one of its actions or if it has acted in bad faith. The requirement to act in good faith is 
unquestionably an aspect that could not be relinquished in the Authority's process but it 
could become a loophole for complaints of unsatisfied parties. 
In addition, any statutory decision made by the Authority can be reviewed in a 
judicial review by the Court but only after all other ways of appeal have been exhausted.61 
51 Employment Law Guide (5 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 2001 ) [ERJ79.2] 
58 s 179(3) ERA 
59 s 183 ERA 
60 s 179(4) ERA 
61 s 194 ERA 
18 
(a) What does 'good faith' mean? 
One must distinguish between the duty of the parties to act in good faith with each 
other and the duty of the Authority member to act in good faith towards the parties. The 
term "good faith" is mainly used in collective bargaining; therefore definitions have 
always had this procedure in mind. In case the parties are dealing with each other or with 
the Authority the situation is comparable to the one of collective bargaining. In both 
situations either party wants to achieve an advantage without giving away too much. 
Consequently, most of the good faith requirements could be used here as well. The 
Minister of Labour has approved a Code of Good Faith62 for collective bargaining. 
Provisions of the Code of Good Faith have to be used were appropriate. Number 5.1 of the 
Code requires the parties have to indicate any concerns about whether the other side is not 
acting in good faith. This requirement should also be effective during the process before 
the Authority. Whenever the parties think a member of the Authority is not acting in good 
faith they should explain this to the member in order to enable the member to carry on in 
good faith. In case they do not do so they themselves act in bad faith and are not entitled 
to have their issue reviewed before the Court anymore. 
More difficult is the situation where the Authority member is acting towards the 
parties. The Authority is not required to act in good faith but its determination could be 
challenged if acting in bad faith .63 Because the Act is using the term good faith in other 
sections of the ERA one must define good faith and conclude that everything that is not 
good faith is automatically bad faith. 
The explanatory note of the Employment Relations Bill distinguished between the 
"general principles of good faith" and other more specific principles. This division is 
realised through the general requirements of good faith in s 4(1) ERA. The core principles 
for good faith bargaining are established in s 32 ERA. Hence, no such description exists 
for the dispute resolution institutions only the general principles will apply here. 
In general, good faith is based on mutual trust, confidence and fair dealing 
between the parties. 64 This includes not directly or indirectly misleading or deceiving each 
62 Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collective Agreements < www.ers.dol.govt.nz/act/code.htm1 > (last 
accessed 22/05/02) 
63 s 184(2)(c) ERA 
64 Employment Relations Bill Explanatory Note Governmental Note (2000) 2 ELB 25, 27 
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other.
65 
In my opinion this aspect does not fit into the Authority's neutral role. There is no 
reason imaginable why a member of the Authority should mislead the parties. A clear 
advantage of the tripartite dispute resolution system. The Act in s 4 comes from the 
assumption that good faith in the ERA has to be respected in a two party relationship, 
either between employee and employer or between unions and employers or their 
representatives. 
Good faith behaviour requires also that the Authority member is not dealing with 
the parties directly when they are represented, even when the investigator thinks that the 
process will benefit from a direct involvement of the parties. 
The Court can accept a challenge where the Authority suffers from lack of 
jurisdiction caused by acting in bad faith. The question is whether the Court finds that the 
Authority has acted in bad faith, does it have to alter the determination? Must it also 
consider whether the decision would be different if the Authority has not acted in bad 
faith? If the Court answers this question "no" it would be unnecessary to hold a hearing de 
novo when the outcome remains the same. 
In case a party challenges the determination it must be assumed that the 
Employment Court at first will have to accept a complaint of a party because it will 
require deeper investigation to clarify whether the Authority has acted in bad faith or not. 
But decisions of the Authority stay in effect for as long as the Court has not decided 
otherwise. Consequently, there is no apparent disadvantage in this provision. 
3. The Employment Court 
The Employment Court is the third step in the employment relations system. Its 
primary role is now to decide difficult cases especially where industrial dispute-settlement 
is involved and when a party challenges the determination of the Authority.66 The Court 
also has jurisdiction to determine all matters that come before it as it thinks fit in equity 
and good conscience. 
For some matters the Employment Court is the first institution because they are too 
complicated or too important to be conferred on the Authority. These are, for example, to 
determine whether a person is an employee or to determine the lawfulness of strike or 
lockout.67 It has the same jmisdiction as the Authority to make orders according to 
65 Mazengarb 's Employment Law (lose leave, Butterworths, Wellington) [ER.12] 
66 s 187 ERA 
67 s lOO(l)(a) ERA 
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individual employment agreements.68 It has not the power to cancel or vary collective 
agreements. But it has under s 192 ERA the power to suspend a single term of the 
agreement and to order the parties to reopen bargaining. 
In accordance with its exclusive jurisdiction the Court has a wide power to call for 
any information or evidence that it thinks fit, regardless whether it is strictly legal or not. 69 
In common with Authority and Mediation Service the Court has the provision of 
flexibility. 
Where the Court has to decide about a matter it at first has to consider whether the 
parties have made an adequate Mediation attempt. If not, it has to order further 
Mediation.70 The Act does not determine which attempt is adequate. But the same 
consideration has to be done by the Authority as well so both institutions should use the 
same definition. A Mediation attempt has not been sufficient where the parties have not 
used the Mediation service at all or where the parties have acted in bad faith towards each 
other. An attempt has also not been made where the parties have not contributed enough 
to the procedure so that the other side was reasonably able to agree to a settlement. 
When the Court is dealing with a challenge by making a hearing de nova the 
nature of the hearing should be that the court establishes its own opinion without referring 
to the Authority's determination. However, the Court of Appeal decided in Coutts Cars 
Ltd v Baguel/1 that the Court should not be constrained by the determination but should 
recognise its arguments. 
Orders, decisions or proceedings can under s 193 ERA only be challenged on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction. A Court's decision can be appealed to the Court of Appeal 
on question of law only (s 214 ERA). 
In relation to the Authority the Court does not have the power to advise or direct 
the Authority on how it should use its investigative powers and jurisdiction.72 But it does 
have the power to review whether the Authority has complied with the principles of 
natural justice. 
68 s 190 ERA 
69 Gilbert, Scott-Howman, Smith A Guide to the Employment Relations Act (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 
10.24 
70 s 188(2) ERA 
71 Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguely [2002] 6 NZELC 96, 97 (CA) Gault J 
72 s 188(4) ERA 
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III. Employment dispute resolution in different countries 
1. German/3 
The dispute resolution system for labour relationships in Germany has to be 
distinguished between indi victual and collective relations. The first step for indi victual 
dispute resolution normally takes place between the parties themselves, mostly 
represented by a lawyer. A representation through a union or an employers' association is 
also possible. This stage of dispute resolution is entirely voluntary and not regulated in 
legislation. In practise, lawyers give written offers for a settlement to the other party and 
after exchanging some of these offers the parties will settle their dispute in a mutual 
agreement. This first attempt became a part of custom in order to avoid legal costs. If the 
parties cannot reach an agreement one party will take legal action to the Employment 
Court. 
The first official step in Court is the conciliatory hearing.74 A major principle 
before the employment court is the expedited procedure (Beschleunigsgrundsatz/5 . This 
means the judge has to accelerate the process wherever possible. The overall aim is to 
secure that the parties reach an agreement as soon as possible. Where they do not reach an 
agreement it enables the judge to compose a judgment immediately. This limits the risk of 
legal costs for the parties especially in unfair dismissal cases where employers have to pay 
outstanding wages. If the parties meet for an additional hearing the judge encourages them 
to agree to a contemporary appointment. 
§ 54 (s 1) (cl 3) of the Employment Court Code contains the patterns for a 
compulsory conciliatory hearing. The whole hearing is more an informal Mediation 
process rather than a legal proceeding, despite its appearance. The parties have to carry 
out this hearing before they can get a judgement. During this phase the judge can act with 
disregard to certain formalities. The Court, for example, does not call the parties to 
exchange written statements about the dispute. This should enable judge and parties to 
have an unaffected conversation without having already an opinion in mind. Furthermore, 
the judge is only allowed to take actions that could be made immediately during the 
procedure, so no time is lost because the parties have to produce additional documents or 
call for witnesses. Judge and parties have to work with the documents they brought to the 
first hearing. The judge can investigate by examining the parties. The aim of the 
73 for non New Zealand legislation see Appendix I 
74 § 54 s l cl l Employment Court Code (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz) 
75 § 9 s l Employment Court Code (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz) 
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conciliatory hearing is to reach a compromise. The role of the judge is thus inducing the 
parties to settle their dispute in a mutual agreement. He/She is doing so by giving legal 
advice and making suggestions for a settlement. In practice, an effective method is 
pointing out how a possible judgement could look if the parties do not agree to a 
comprormse. Often parties then decide to settle their dispute rather than having a 
judgement. The agreement is similar to a contract, so formal court provisions are not 
necessary to make the agreement legally binding. 
The hearing takes place the first time the parties appear before the court but the 
judge can order further hearings when he/she thinks a settlement could be reached in a 
later hearing. The employment court usually consists of a professional judge and two lay 
judges; one each from the employee's and employers' side, but in the conciliatory hearing 
it consists only of the professional judge. 
In case the parties cannot agree to a settlement the judge will appoint a date to 
commence the normal legal proceeding. The judge will in this case not refer to the 
conciliatory hearing. It is treated like it has never happened. 
For collective disputes no resolution mechanism exists. The parties are dealing 
with the issues on their own. In practice, if no agreement is reached after a certain time the 
parties usually agree to an adjudicator. Strikes and lockouts are usually not practised 
during this time although unions use token strikes to support their demands. The collective 
partners usually agree to a dispute resolution process in advance. 
2. Ireland 
Ireland is one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. It is argued that a reason 
1s the small amount of industrial disputes. The Labour Relations Commission76 is the 
institution for dispute resolution in Ireland. It deals with both individual and collective 
disputes. 
Following the Industrial Relations Act the Rights Commissioner77 is appointed to 
investigate disputes, grievances and claims of individuals or small groups of workers. The 
proceeding begins when a party submits an issue to the Commissioner's office. The 
Commissioner will then schedule a hearing where the parties present their cases. 
Commissioners are employees of the Labour Relations Commission. They are 
76 Industrial Relations Act 1990 s 24 (1) 
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experienced Mediators but not judges. Despite this lack of legal education their decisions 
are binding. The Commissioners investigate the matter and settle the dispute by making 
either non-binding recommendations or binding decisions, depending on the legislation 
under which a case is referred.78 Should the parties not be able to settle their claim or the 
parties wish recommendations or decisions reviewed, the Commissioner will appeal to the 
Employments Appeal Tribunal. If further investigation is necessary or a complicated 
question of law arises the case will directly be referred to the Labour Court. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal is a body of appeal but mainly it is the first step 
for individual claims such as redundancy, payments or leave. It consists of a chairman and 
a union and an employer's representative. The Tribunal's purpose is to handle disputes in 
a fair and speedy way for individuals who seek remedies for infringements of their 
statutory rights. After a claim has been filed a copy of the claim is sent to the person 
against whom the claim is made in order to arrange an appointment with the parties for a 
hearing. The nature of the hearing is investigatory. The chairman will examine parties and 
witnesses in order to assess the evidence. After the hearing the chairman makes a binding 
decision. Against this decision a further appeal to the Labour Court is possible which will 
then conclude with a legally binding decision.79 
To settle collective disputes the Industrial Relations Commission provides a 
Conciliation service. S 42 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990 provides the Commission 
with the power to create a Code of Practice, which regulates the Conciliation process. The 
parties can refer to this service "[ w ]here negotiating arrangements are not in place and 
where collective bargaining fails to take place"80. An Industrial Relations Officer whose 
function is to mediate between the parties carries the Conciliation service out. 81 He/She is 
appointed by the Commission and comes from an independent public service 
background.82 The Conciliation process is informal and non-legalistic in its practice and 
voluntary in its process. The aim is to reach a mutual agreement to settle the dispute. The 
77 s35(1) 
78 EMIRE Ireland< www.eurofound.ie/emire/lRELAND/RIGHTSCOMMISSIONER-IR.html > (last accessed 
08/05/02) 
79 Guide to the Labour Court< www.labourcourt.ie/labour/labour.nsf/LookupPageLink/HomeServiceGuide > 
(last accessed O 1/05/02) 5 
80 s 2 of the Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution under section 42 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1990 
81 S 42 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990 Provides the Commission with the power to create a Code of 
Practice, which regulates the Conciliation process. 
82 Conciliation Service< www.lrc .ie/lrc_services/Conciliation_service.htm > (last accessed 09/05/02) 
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Officer has no power to make decisions against the will of the parties nor 1s he/she 
investigating the issues. 
In case the Conciliation fails the Labour Court will investigate the dispute. The 
investigation proceeding commences when the Commission has reported to the Court that 
no further efforts could be made in order to resolve the dispute and the parties have 
requested investigation.83 Besides, the Labour Court is not a court of law despite its 
name. 84 It functions as an industrial relations tribunal. After investigating the dispute the 
Court makes a recommendation that is not binding for the parties. 
3. England and Wales 
In case a party wants to litigate in England or Wales it will not find a separate 
Employment Court system. Claims must be made before a tripartite employment tribunal 
or if it is a financial claim, which is not directly related to the employment contract, the 
country courts. The reason is that financial claims are treated as normal contractual claims 
between employee and employer and the country courts are first instance in the civil 
procedure. 85 
The industrial dispute resolution procedure is similar in its hierarchy to the one in 
New Zealand. In the first step the parties try to reach a private settlement. The Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) supports the effort by providing assistance 
through Mediation. The service is an offer to the parties it is used voluntarily. Settlements 
must also be agreed voluntarily and Officers do not help the parties by recommending 
terms of settlement. ACAS works independently from governmental supervision. Its 
patterns are outlined in the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.86 If a party believes there is 
a ground for a complaint he/she fills out an application form and submits it to the 
Employment Tribunal. It will forward the request to the ACAS. The Tribunal also sends a 
copy to the other party including the request to comment. The Conciliation Officer will 
then invite the parties to meet in order to resolve the problem. An agreed settlement is 
recorded and becomes binding when both parties had independent legal advice in advance 
in order to be able to rate the effects of the agreement. The service is free of charge for the 
parties. 
83 Industrial Relations Act 1990 s 26 ( 1) 
84 Guide to the Labour Court< www.labourcourt.ie/labour/labour.nsf/LookupPageLink/HomeServiceGuide > 
(last accessed 01/05/02) 5 
85 S. Deakin and G.S. Morris labour law (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1998) 2.4. 
86 s 18 and s 19 
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Since May 2001 the ACAS also offers Arbitration in order to resole unfair 
dismissal disputes. Cases dealt with in Arbitration do not come before the Employment 
Tribunal because the decision is binding and cannot be reviewed by the Employment 
Tribunal. The hearing takes place in private and will be kept confidential. Arbitration is 
voluntary so any party can withdraw at any time or agree to a settlement at any stage of 
the process. In the hearing the Arbitrator is the only one who can examine witnesses 
he/she is also not bound by other rules of procedure than the Order. 87 The advantage for 
the parties is fewer costs and a final decision made more quickly. 
Should Conciliation fail the parties can apply for a hearing before the Employment 
Tribunal. The Service of the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal is 
provided by the Employment Tribunals Service, which is an executive agency of the 
Department of Trade and Industry. 88 The Tribunals consist of a chairperson and two Jay 
members coming from the employee and employer side. The chairperson has jurisdiction 
to decide cases on his/her own if the plaintiff desires statutory payment from the 
employer. This claim is only decided on the grounds of law and therefore does not 
necessarily need the opinion of the labour parties. 
If the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a matter it will hold a pre-hearing where the 
parties present written and oral statements. After the pre-hearing, which is carried out only 
by the chairman, the chairman will respond to the appellant whether the claim has 
"reasonable prospect of success".89 In case it has no prospect of success the appellant can 
only continue by paying a deposit . This ensures that the public does not have the burden 
of unreasonable costs . 
The full hearing in which a lawyer mostly represents the parties follows this. The 
form of the proceeding is adversarial rather than investigatory in nature. Each party has to 
present and prove its case and is entitled to cross-examine the other party's witnesses.90 
But the Tribunal can order disclosure and compel witnesses to attend. However, the 
proceeding should remain informal were appropriate and not be bound by any enactment 
or rule of Jaw for proceedings and evidence in the courts of law. 91 
The process concludes with a summary of the chairman. This summary is a 
judgement, which contains the relevant facts , the decision and a short reasoning. The 
87 The ACAS Arbitration Scheme (England and Wales) Order 2001 
88 Deakin and Morri s, 2.4 . l . 
89 The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001 Schedule 1 cl 7(4) 
90 R . Rogowski and T . Wilthagen Reflexive Labour Law (Deventer, Kluwer, 1994) 81 
91 The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001Schedule 1 cl 11 
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parties can request an extended version because an appeal could only be preceded with a 
full reasoning.92 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal hears appeals from Employment Tribunals on 
points of law. It has the same powers as the High Court with regard to the process 
including summon of witnesses and the request for evidence. The Tribunal can make its 
own entirely new decision or order the case back to the original tribunal, which in this 
case has to consider the guidelines of the Appeal Tribunal. 
4. Canada 
The Canadian industrial dispute system is spilt up into the federal legislation that 
covers some selected federal jurisdiction industries (such as banking, broadcasting or 
interprovincial transportation)93 and the legislation of the provinces that covers industries 
based in the provinces. Here only the federal dispute resolution mechanism will be 
presented. 
Canada has experienced its latest industrial dispute resolution changes in 1999. 
The Canadian Labour Code was amended to establish the Canadian Industrial Relations 
Board. It is established by Part I s 9 of the Canadian Labour Code as an independent, 
representational, quasi-judicial tribunal responsible for the interpretation and application 
of the Code. 94 
Industrial disputes are usually resolved in two steps through Conciliation and 
Mediation. In case of a dispute, most likely during collective bargaining, either party can 
address the Ministry of Labour filing a notice of dispute. The Ministry will forward the 
note to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMAS). The neutral Conciliation 
Officer will meet with the parties sorting out the problems in order to bring the bargaining 
process to a successful ending. 
Where Conciliation attempts have not been successful either party or the Minister 
of Labour can request Mediation. An Officer of the FMAS also provides Mediation. 
During the Mediation period the parties have the legal right of strike or lockout. In 
practise, only after an unsuccessful Mediation process the parties commence with 
industrial action. 95 
92 Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 s 3(1 )( c) 
93 G.P. Rossiter "Labour dispute resolution in Canada" (200 1) 8 ELB 158,158 
94 Canada Industrial Relations Board Estimates 2000-2001 < www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/tbsplans/00-
0l/dwnld/rppOO_e.pdf > (last accessed 15/05/02) 3 
95 Mediation and Conciliation Services< http://labour-travail.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca > (last accessed 15/05/02) 
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In case the parties cannot reach a settlement through Mediation or the Officer 
thinks that Mediation is not appropriate he/she will investigate the facts and write a report, 
which will be forwarded to the Labour Relations Board. The report does not contain any 
conclusions or favours a single party. It should only enable the Board to commence with 
its work. In order to commence a proceeding the trade union or employers' organisation 
has to apply in writing to the Board. The Board will either convene a new full hearing or 
meet only with the parties to make a determination based on the report and the evidence 
given by the parties. The Board has the right to examine witnesses, call for evidence or 
order disclosure but it has not to work in compliance with the formalities of a Court. The 
hearing is held by a chairperson and a union and an employers ' organisation member. 
Every order or decision made by the Officer is final and binding and could usually 
not be reviewed by a court.96 Review is only possible if the Board has acted outside its 
jurisdiction, failed to observe a principle of natural justice or has acted by reason of fraud. 
The procedure is similar where the dispute is individual in nature. Where a party 
has applied to the Board for settlement of a dispute the Board will forward the application 
to a Labour Relation Officer. The Officer will inform every party affected by the 
application and call for responses. If necessary the party' s will be invited to a pre-hearing 
to make an attempt to resolve the problem. During the Mediation meeting the Officer will 
try to settle the dispute. The aim is a speedy and informal process to reach a mutual 
agreement. Most individual disputes are solved in this stage. Where this is not possible the 
Officer will make an inquiry of the matter and report to the Board. The parties will have 
the chance to comment on this report. A hearing that concludes with a final decision 
follows this .97 An appeal is possible under the same circumstances like in collective 
disputes . 
5. Comparison between the institutions 
After showing the approach of some other countries to resolve employment 
relationship disputes a comparison of the differences and similarities may now be made. 
When evaluating the legislations one sees clearly the difference between the 
Common Law countries and Germany as representative for the Civil Law system. Where 
96 s 22(1) Canada Labour Code; s 18.1(4) Federal Court Act 
97 The Role of the Board' s Labour Relations Officers< www.cirb-ccri.gc.ca/publications/info/2 e.html > (last 
accessed 15/05/02) 
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all Common Law countries prefer three steps in order to resolve their employment 
disputes and have therefore founded three different institutions. Germany has more or less 
only one step and one institution, the Employment Court. The advantage of Conciliation 
and Mediation is recognised in Germany as well but it is still up to the parties to resolve 
their (individual) problems with the help of a Mediator. Consequently, expenses arise 
because Mediators are privately organised and charge for their service. There is no public 
institution that offers Mediation service or at least legal information. This role is mostly 
taken over by lawyers, trade unions or employers' associations. A reason might is that 
industrial disputes are seen as a matter of the collective partners where state influence 
should be kept minimal as possible. The individual employee on the other hand enjoys 
sufficient protection through the law reviewed and enforced through Employment Courts. 
The establishment of an institution in Germany similar to the Employment 
Relations Authority because of constitutional requirements is not possible. Article 101 of 
the German Basic Law guarantees the right that a legal case is heard by a judge and 
Article 92 states "[j]udicial power is vested in the judges". Consequently, a person who is 
not a judge could not make judgements or other enforceable legal determinations. 
A further interesting aspect to look at is the next step where Mediation was not 
successful. The Common Law countries have created an institution in order to avoid an 
early involvement of the Employment Court but their legal status is confusing. New 
Zealand is the exception because it is agreed that, "the Authority is a court of law"98. 
Other countries like Ireland and England are reluctant to describe their Employment 
Tribunals as a court although it has the same powers and responsibilities. Probably 
because to underline the non-formal proceedings the word 'court ' is omitted. However, in 
Germany and New Zealand the second step of dispute resolution takes place in a court 
even if New Zealand does not give it that name. Further simila1ities are that both tribunals 
have an investigating process where the facts are established and both institutions can act 
without regard to certain fonnalities. One might say that New Zealand has made 
Mediators into "judges" and Germany has made judges into Mediators. 
A further difference is found in the labour jurisdiction of the countries. In all the 
examined count1ies, except Canada, the (federal) government has jurisdiction to establish 
the laws of employment. The Canada Labour Code is primarily concerned with collective 
98 Alastair Dumbleton "The Employment Relations Authority gets under way" (2001) 26(1 ) NZJIR 119, 120 
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aspects of labour relations whereas individual employment rights are a matter of the 
provinces.99 Consequently, Canada consists of many different dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
Also unique is the Canadian approach to have a separate body for the investigation 
process and the final decision. The Labour Relations Board decision is based on the 
findings of the Officer. But it is problematic if the Mediator is simultaneously the 
investigator because of the conflicting nature of the functions. 100 Its final report should not 
support one side but with the experience of the Mediation process it is difficult not to be 
biased, especially where the other party has prevented the settlement. As shown above the 
Authority is not bound by certain rules of practice only by the principle of natural justice. 
A conflict exists where the Authority makes legal determinations without having to 
respect a legal procedure. Canada has solved the problem because investigating the facts 
and making a final decision are made by two different institutions. In this case the 
investigator can work without legal formalities but the procedure that leads to the final 
decision is held before a body that has to respect certain court rules . 
Similarities between Ireland and New Zealand are found in the investigating power 
of the dispute resolution institution based on the judges role in Civil Law countries. Both 
countries favour a strong investigator rather than responsible parties in order to achieve a 
final settlement. Nonetheless, Ireland has decided to create different mechanisms for 
individual and collective disputes. Regarding the fact that in New Zealand mostly single 
employers bargain with trade unions a separation of dispute resolution duties similar to 
Ireland is not necessary. 
There are some obvious differences between Common Law countries and 
Germany as Civil Law country. Differences exist in both the individual and collective 
dispute resolution procedure. Collective dispute resolution begins in all jurisdictions with 
Conciliation. Germany has in this area no legal proceedings only customised processes 
and offers no state resolution system. The other countries, however, have developed a 
detailed resolution proceeding, which could be used voluntarily to avoid industrial action. 
In Ireland, as an example, the industrial partners could go through Conciliation and 
investigation in order to settle the issues. This may be the reason for the small amount of 
industrial disputes in Ireland. Canada on the other hand has a compulsory dispute 
99 G.P. Rossiter "Labour dispute resolution in Canada" (2001 ) 8 ELB 158, 160 
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resolution procedure for federal industries in order to prevent industrial action m 
important industries. This kind of dispute resolution has in Germany no tradition because 
the independence of industrial partners is respected in Germany. As a result the parties can 
at any time quit dispute resolution process and resolve their issues on their own or take 
industrial action. In defending the German lack of industrial dispute resolution institutions 
one must recognise that the amount of industrial action is not significantly higher than in 
other countries. 
IV. Conclusion 
Making an overall evaluation it could be said that employment dispute resolution 
systems are working successfully in all countries. Statistics of all countries show that 
about 2/3 of the cases are solved at the first stage in Mediation or Conciliation. 101 As a 
result of this success governments have created more and more detailed dispute resolution 
mechanisms over the last years. I see a hazard in the tendency extending the jurisdiction 
of industrial tribunals at the cost of Employment Courts. There are good reason why 
Courts have to comply with legal procedure rules. Mainly the protection of witnesses and 
parties are under threat to be eliminated. Moreover, Employment Courts are limited in 
their jurisdiction to review decisions of indust1ial tribunals. I believe that one should not 
sacrifice basic judicial principles for the purpose of a quick settlement. Moreover, it is 
also a matter of concern that clear legal procedure determinations such as the laws of 
evidence are replaced by uncertain principles such as natural justice. Is much more 
difficult for the Court to determine the patterns of these terms and to decide whether they 
have been respected or not. Consequently, Employment Courts are under threat of losing 
their main tasks of making legal determination in employment disputes. Courts in the 
reviewed Common Law countries are now limited to dealing with legally difficult 
questions that require legal expertise. 
Complications could arise from the fact that members of the Authority are not 
professionally dealing with the law. The Employment Relations Authority has now 
100 Rossiter, 160 
101 see for example: Ireland (85%) Labour Relations Commission Annual Report, 4 < 
www.lrc.ie/images/lrc2000 4.pdf > or England (71 %) ACAS Annual Report 20 
<www .acas.org. uk/publications/pdf/ar200 !_complete. pdf (last accessed 05/06/02) 
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abilities formally carried out by the Employment Court. I agree with Judge Colgan 102 
when expressing concerns about the fact that the Authority is dealing with relatively 
complex legal matters without having knowledge of at least general legal principles. 
Errors in the procedure could terminate the purpose of a speedy process and delay the 
whole settlement. In Baguley v Coutts Cars Ltd1°3 the Authority decided that not revealing 
the criteria for choosing a certain person for redundancy is not bad faith. The 
determination has been challenged by the applicant in the Employment Court, which 
decided that the employer has not acted in good faith. 104 This relatively simple 
redundancy case was brought up to the Court of Appeal before a final decision was 
reached. Germany, in this aspect, could be a role model where the judge functions also as 
a Mediator. It is surely easier to train judges as Mediators than vice versa. 
Without question the provision of natural justice, good faith and the investigation 
process are linked together in certain ways. It is most likely that a breach of good faith is 
also a breach of natural justice and vice versa. The most delicate of the Authority's power 
is the ability to investigate matters ; errors are most likely to occur in connection with this 
power. Although the definition of natural justice is not entirely clear this term has a 
positive effect because it is flexible and will work as a safeguard. It will be a future task of 
the Employment Court to narrow down the term. In case the role of the Authority and the 
provision of natural justice are corning into conflict I would favour letting the provision of 
an informal and speedy proceeding prevail. Should the Authority not be successful in long 
term with a safeguard, in future such a safeguard could be omitted in order to achieve this 
goal. The German legislation contains the limitation that parties can only use findings they 
can provide directly during the hearing. This might be a fair and useful regulation to 
restrict the principle of natural justice in practice. 
As early as in 1951 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) recommended 
(Recommendation No. 92) that industrial disputes are best settled in voluntary 
Conciliation machinery. The ILO has also recommended that such a system should be free 
of charge; otherwise especially employees would use the service only reluctantly. 
Common Law countries have adopted this idea and it is undoubtedly successful, in 
102 Judge Colgan "comments on Baguley v Coutts Cars ltcf ' (2002) l ELB 13,16 
103 Baguely v Coutts Cars Ltd (2001) 6 NZELC 96, 155 
104 Baguley v Coutts Cars Ltd [2002] 2 ERNZ 409, 410 (AC) per Goddard CJ 
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contrast to Germany where no governmental dispute resolution service is offered. A 
voluntary and free Conciliation service could improve the German labour relations. 
Finally I would like to address the collective dispute resolution mechanisms that 
have been mentioned. Germany is the only country that is not offering a state dispute 
resolution service. One reason could be that in Germany unions do not bargain with single 
employers but only with employers' organisations. These agreements cover a huge 
amount of people because they are negotiated by area and industry. A single Mediator 
without legal or commercial background might not be able to deal with this responsibility. 
Industrial disputes and personal grievances are in this respect not comparable because the 
consequences for the economy are far more significant. Nonetheless , I think the solutions 
some countries offer are promising. For example, Ireland has shown the advantages of its 
service. The service is split between individual and collective disputes, whereas individual 
disputes concluding with a binding decision but collective disputes remain voluntarily. 
This model could also be used in Germany because the collective partners stay in control 
during the whole process and their independence is secured. 
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Appendix I 
Germany 
Labour Court Code1 
§ 9 Allgemeine Verfahrensvorschriften 
(1) Das Verfahren ist in allen Rechtszi.igen zu beschleunigen. 
§9 general proceeding rules 
(1) The process must be accelerated in all instances. 
§ 54 Giiteverfahren 
(1) Die mi.indliche Verhandlung beginnt mit einer Verhandlung vor dem Vorsitzenden zum 
Zwecke der gi.itlichen Einigung der Parteien (Gi.iteverhandlung). Der Vorsitzende hat zu 
diesem Zwecke das gesamte Streitverhaltnis mit den Parteien unter freier Wi.irdigung aller 
Umstande zu erortem. Zur Aufklarung des Sachverhalts kann er alle Handlungen vomehmen, 
die sofort erfolgen konnen. Eidliche Vemehmungen sind jedoch ausgeschlossen. Der 
Vorsitzende kann die Gi.iteverhandlung mit Zustimmung der Parteien in einem weiteren 
Termin, der alsbald stattzufinden hat, fortsetzen. 
§54 conciliatory hearing 
(1) The oral proceeding begins with a proceeding before the chairman for the purpose of a 
conciliatory agreement between the parties (conciliatory hearing) . The chairman has for this 
purpose to examine the entire dispute with the paities by taking freely all circumstances into 
account. In order to detect the facts of the case he can take all actions that could be undertaken 
immediately. Examinations under oath are prohibited. The chairman can proceed the 
conciliatory hearing with agreement of the parties in a further appointment, which has to be 
take place as soon as possible. 
Basic Law 
Article 92 [Court organization] Judicial power is vested in the judges; it is exercised by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, by the federal comts provided for in this Constitution, and by 
the courts of the States [Lander].D 
Article 101 [Ban on extraordinary courts] (1) Extraordinary courts are inadmissible. No 
one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge. 
Ireland 
1 translation by Patrick Moll 
Industrial Relations Act 1990 
24.-(1) There shall be a body to be known as the Labour Relations Commission to fulfil the 
functions assigned to it by this Act. 
35.-(1) The rights commissioners shall operate as a service of the Commission and 
references to rights commissioners in the Industrial Relations Act, 1969, the Unfair 
Dismissals Act, 1977, and the Maternity Protection of Employees Act, 1981, shall be taken to 
be references to rights commissioners so operating. 
42.-(1) The Commission shall prepare draft codes of practice concerning industrial relations 
for submission to the Minister, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Minister. 
Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution 
2 - PROCEDURES 
Where negotiating arrangements are not in place and where collective bargaining fails to take 
place, the following process should be put in place with which management and unions 
should fully cooperate in seeking to resolve the issues in dispute effectively and 
expeditiously:-
1. In the first instance, the matter should be referred to the Labour Relations Commission who 
will appoint an Officer from its Advisory Service to assess the issues in dispute. 
2. The Labour Relations Commission Officer will work with the parties in an attempt to 
resolve the issues in dispute. 
3. In the event that the issues in dispute are not capable of early resolution by the Labour 
Relations Commission intervention, an agreed cooling-off period shall be put in place. During 
the cooling- off period the Labour Relations Commission Advisory Service will continue to 
work with the parties in an attempt to resolve any outstanding issues. The Commission may 
engage expert assistance, including involvement of ICTU and IBEC, should that prove helpful 
to the resolution of any differences. 
4. If after the cooling-off period all issues have been resolved, the Labour Relations 
Commission will disengage. Before disengaging, the Commission may make proposals to the 
parties for the peaceful resolution of any further grievances or disputes. 
5. In the event of issues remaining unresolved after the cooling-off period, the Labour 
Relations Commission shall make a written report to the Labour Court on the situation. The 
Labour Court shall consider the position of the employer and the union and shall issue 
recommendations on outstanding matters. 
England and Wales 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996 
18. (2) Where an application has been presented to an industrial tribunal, and a copy of it has 
been sent to a conciliation officer, it is the duty of the conciliation officer-
(a) if he is requested to do so by the person by whom and the person against whom the 
proceedings are brought, or 
(b) if, in the absence of any such request, the conciliation officer considers that he could 
act under this subsection with a reasonable prospect of success, 
to endeavour to promote a settlement of the proceedings without their being determined 
by an industrial tribunal. 
19. Industrial tribunal procedure regulations shall include in relation to industrial tribunal 
proceedings in the case of which any enactment makes provision for conciliation-
(a) provisions requiring a copy of the application by which the proceedings are instituted, 
and a copy of any notice relating to it which is lodged by or on behalf of the person 
against whom the proceedings are brought, to be sent to a conciliation officer, 
(b) provisions securing that the applicant and the person against whom the proceedings 
are brought are notified that the services of a conciliation officer are available to them, 
and 
(c) provisions postponing the hearing of any such proceedings for such period as may be 
determined in accordance with the regulations for the purpose of giving an opportunity 
for the proceedings to be settled by way of conciliation and withdrawn. 
The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001 
Schedule 1 
Pre-hearing review 
7. (4) If upon a pre-hearing review the tribunal considers that the contentions put forward by 
any party in relation to a matter required to be determined by a tribunal have no reasonable 
prospect of success, the tribunal may make an order against that party requiring the party to 
pay a deposit of an amount not exceeding £500 as a condition of being permitted to continue 
to take part in the proceedings relating to that matter. 
Canada 
Canada Labour Code 
9. (1) A board is established, to be known as the Canada Industrial Relations Board. 
(2) The Board is composed of 
(a) a Chairperson , to hold office on a full-time basis; 
(b) two or more Vice-Chairpersons, to hold office on a full-time basis, and any other Vice-
Chairpersons, to hold office on a part-time basis, that the Governor in Council considers 
necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Board; 
(c) not more than six other members , of which not more than three represent employees, 
and of which not more than three represent employers, to hold office on a full-time basis; 
(d) any other part-time members , representing, in equal numbers , employees and 
employers , that the Governor m Council considers necessary to discharge the 
responsibilities of the Board; and 
(e) any other part-time members that the Governor in Council considers necessary to assist 
the Board in carrying out its functions under Part II. 
International Labour Organisation 
Recommendation No. 52 
I. Voluntary Conciliation 
1. Voluntary conciliation machinery, appropriate to national conditions, should be made 
available to assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between employers 
and workers. 
2. Where voluntary conciliation machinery is constituted on a joint basis, it should include 
equal representation of employers and workers. 
3. 
(1) The procedure should be free of charge and expeditious; such time limits for the 
proceedings as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations should be fixed in advance 
and kept to a minimum. 
(2) Provision should be made to enable the procedure to be set in motion , either on the 
initiative of any of the parties to the dispute or ex officio by the voluntary conciliation 
authority. 
4. If a dispute has been submitted to conciliation procedure with the consent of all the parties 
concerned, the latter should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and lockouts while 
conciliation is in progress. 
5. All agreements which the parties may reach during conciliation procedure or as a result 
thereof should be drawn up in writing and be regarded as equivalent to agreements concluded 
in the usual manner. 
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